

Message Text

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R 192103Z AUG 77
FM USMISSION USUN NEWYORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4960
INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY GUATEMLA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL BELIZE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 USUN 2662

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP, (YOUNG, ANDREW), UNGA, BH, GT, UK, XL, XM,
SHUM, EAID, ETRD,SA, PN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S BREAKFAST MEETING WITH VENEZUELAN
PRESIDENT PEREZ

1. SUMMARY: ON AUGUST 11 AMBASSADORS YOUNG AND VAKY, DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES SHELTON, AND FRANK, ARA/PPC DIRECTOR
EINAUDI, AND DEPUTY HUMAN RIGHTS COORDINATOR SCHNEIDER, HAD
A WORKING BREAKFAST WITH VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT PEREZ, HEAD
OF THE VENEZUELAN INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN TRADE FIGUEREDO,
FOREIGN MINISTER CONSALVI AND MINISTER FOR INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS PEREZ GUERRERO AT WHICH THEY DISCUSSED A
BROAD RANGE OF HEMISPHERIC AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ISSUES.
PEREZ EXPRESSED GREAT CONCERN ABOUT BELIZE AND, EXPRESSED SUP-
PORT FOR OUR NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY. FIGUEREDO
DISCUSSED GOV ATTITUDES TOWARD THE ANDEAN PACT WHERE THE
TWO IMMEDIATE ISSUES ARE AUTOMOTIVE DEVELOPMENT AND THE
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DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT. PEREZ SAID THAT
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IS THE ONLY WAY FOR LATIN AMERICA TO
BECOME MORE COMPETITIVE. HE SAID THERE IS NO SOLUTION FOR
PERU'S SERIOUS ECONOMIC SITUATION AS LONG AS PERU THINKS
OF WAR WITH CHILE. PEREZ GUERRO EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT
US WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ILO. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION
FROM THE VENEZUELAN SIDE, YOUNG REVIEWED DEVELOPMENTS IN

SOUTHERN AFRICA. PEREZ SAID VENEZUELA HAD MADE A MISTAKE BY VIRTUALLY DISENGAGING FROM HAITI. PEREZ EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY AND THE HOPE OF STRENGTHENING THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. HE ALSO SUGGESTED INVITING ALL LATIN AMERICAN PRESIDENTS TO THE SIGNING OF THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY TO DEMONSTRATE LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY AND HELP RATIFICATION. END SUMMARY.

2. BELIZE: CARLOS ANDROS PEREZ EXPRESSED HIS DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE SITUATION IN BELIZE. GUATEMALA IS EXTREMELY HARDLINE AND, CAP BELIEVES, WILL ACCEPT THE INDEPENDENCE OF BELIZE ONLY IN THE EVENT OF SUBSTANTIAL TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS. CAP SAYS THIS WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE BELIZEANS. THE MILITARY IS EXTREMELY HARDLINE, MAINLY ALLIED WITH THE ARANA FORCES, AND IT DOMINATES THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN GUATEMALA INCLUDING LAUGERUD, A MODERATE. GENERAL LUCAS, THE LIKELY FUTURE PRESIDENT OF GUATEMALA, IS VERY TOUGH ON BELIZE. THE OPPOSITION CANDIDATE, GENERAL PERALTA, IS CONSIDERABLY MORE MODERATE AND IS SUPPORTED BY THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS WHO WOULD WIN IN FREE ELECTIONS. THEIR STRENGTH COULD PRECIPITATE MILITARY HARDLINERS TO INTERVENE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS. IF LUCAS IS ELECTED, IT WILL BE CONSIDERABLY MORE DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM. WE MUST GET A SOLUTION AS SOON AS
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POSSIBLE OR WE WILL SEE THE UK FIGHTING WITH A LATIN AMERICAN STATE. CUBA WILL POSSIBLY INTERVENE ON THE SIDE OF BELIZE. WE MUST PUT PRESSURE ON GUATEMALA. THE UK SHOULD PROPOSE AN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION PLAN ALONG THE BELIZE-GUATEMALA BORDER AND BELIZE SHOULD GUARANTEE GUATEMALA ACCESS TO THE SEA; THEY SHOULD ENGAGE IN JOINT OFFSHORE EXPLORATION AND COOPERATE ON DEFENSE AND FOREIGN POLICY. VENEZUELA WILL NOT BACK GUATEMALA IN THE NEXT UN DEBATE ON BELIEZE. MEXICO'S ATTITUDE IS IMPORTANT. LOPEZ PORTILLO SAID AT BOGOTA THAT MEXICO CANNOT BE NEUTRAL IF GUATEMALA INVADES BELIZE. MEXICO WILL ACCEPT THE INDEPENDENCE OF BELIZE BUT NOT PARTITION. AT BOGOTA THERE WAS GENERAL SUPPORT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF BELIZE AND THIS WAS MENTIONED IN THE COMMUNIQUE. GUATEMALA WAS UNHAPPY WITH THE COMMUNIQUE; NEVERTHELESS, THESE KINDS OF PRESSURES MUST CONTINUE IN ORDER TO REACH A QUICK SOLUTION.

3. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM AMBASSADOR YOUNG, PRESIDENT PEREZ RESPONDED THAT VENEZUELA COULD NOT PUSH FOR AN OAS SOLUTION TO THE BELIZE BORDER DISPUTE BECAUSE

OF VENEZUELA'S OWN BORDER DISPUTE WITH GUYANA. IN
RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM MR. EINAUDI, CAP AGREED
THAT GUYANA SHOULD BE A MEMBER OF THE OAS, PARTICULARLY
IN VIEW OF INTERNAL AND FOREIGN POLICY CHANGES. HOWEVER,
CAP FEARS THE OPPOSITION PARTY IN VENEZUELA COULD MAKE
THIS A CAMPAIGN ISSUE. HE SAID THEY ALREADY ASKED WHY
IT WAS NOT RAISED BY CAP AT BOGOTA. CAP EMPHASIZED THAT
HE AND BURNHAM WERE ON BEST OF TERMS AND UNDERSTOOD EACH
OTHER'S POSITION. CAP INTENDS TO TRY TO RESOLVE THIS
PROBLEM SOON AFTER THE ELECTION. HE THEN RETURNED TO
THE SUBJECT OF BELIZE AND INDICATED HE HAD WRITTEN
LETTERS TO LAUGERUD AND HAD SPOKEN TO HIM ON THE SUBJECT
OF BELIZE. PRESIDENT CARTER DISCUSSED WITH PEREZ THE
POSSIBILITY OF HIS BEING A MEDIATOR BUT PEREZ SAYS THIS
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IS DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF THE STRONG FEELINGS OF THE
GUATEMALANS AND HE ALREADY TRIED WITHOUT SUCCESS. CAP
EMPHASIZED THE COMPLEXITY OF THIS MATTER, AND THE
NEED TO PRESSURE GUATEMALA AND TO CONVINCE THE
UK TO OBTAIN CONCESSIONS FROM PRICE. PEREZ IS CONVINCED
THAT PRICE MAY BE WILLING TO MAKE CONCESSIONS AND THE
UK SHOULD PURSUE AS PART OF AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT.
VENEZUELA INTENDS TO OPEN A CONSULATE IN BELIZE IN
THE NEAR FUTURE AS A DEMONSTRATION OF ITS SYMPATHY.
PEREZ BELIEVES THAT CUBA WOULD INTERVENE IN BELIZE AND
THIS WOULD IN TURN TRIGGER EL SALVADOR, A STRONG
GUATEMALAN SUPPORTER. HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA HAVE
DISCREETLY BACKED GUATEMALA. PEREZ SUGGESTED THAT
VANCE WRITE A STRONG, CONFIDENTIAL LETTER TO
LAUGERUD URGING CONCESSIONS.

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FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
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INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
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4. PEREZ INQUIRED AS TO THE RESULTS OF THE GERMANY/US MEETING ON BRAZIL. THE US DELEGATION WAS UNABLE TO SPEAK DEFINITELY. AMBASSADOR YOUNG THOUGHT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN AGREEMENT NOT TO MOVE AHEAD WITH THE NUCLEAR REPROCESSING DEAL. IT WAS EMPHASIZED THAT CARTER IS CONVINCED BRAZIL WANTS TO GO NUCLEAR AND BELIEVES THIS IS DANGEROUS FOR ALL OF LATIN AMERICA. PEREZ INDICATED HE WAS VISITED BY A GERMAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WITH WHOM PEREZ SAID HE WAS TOUGH AND TO WHOM PEREZ EXPRESSED TOTAL OPPOSITION TO THE PROJECT. THE GERMAN OFFICIAL EXPRESSED HIS GOVERNMENT'S WILLINGNESS TO MODIFY THE PROJECT SO THAT THE REPROCESSING PLAN WOULD BE SUBJECT TO MULTILATERAL CONTROLS UNDER LATIN AMERICAN AUSPICES. BUT GERMANY FEELS IT MUST COMPLY WITH THE EXISTING CONTRACT AND WAS UNCERTAIN IF BRAZIL WOULD GO ALONG WITH SUGGESTED CHANGES. HE INDICATED THAT GISCARD AND SCHMIDT HAD AGREED NOT TO CONTRACT SIMILAR
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PROJECTS IN THE FUTURE. PEREZ IS GRATEFUL FOR CARTER'S POSITION ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND HIS PRESSURES ON GERMANY AND BRAZIL. PEREZ AGREED TO SIGN THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.

5. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ON ARGENTINA, PEREZ SAID VIDELA HAD TOLD HIM THAT THEY WERE NEGOTIATING WITH CANADA AND WERE ACCEPTING LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY CANADA AND WERE STUDYING THE POSSIBILITY OF SIGNING THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO. THE GROUPS IN ARGENTINA WHICH FAVOR ARGENTINA HAVING THE BOMB ARE DANGEROUS AND WE MUST WORK TO STRENGTHEN VIDELA, A MODERATE ON THIS ISSUE AND IN PEREZ' VIEW ALSO A POLITICAL MODERATE AMONG THE MILITARY. PARENTHETICALLY, PEREZ WONDERS IF THE KIDNAPPING OF THE VENEZUELAN AMBASSADOR IN ARGENTINA WASN'T BY THE ARMY RATHER THAN BY EXTREMIST GROUPS. IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADVICE FOR DEALING WITH VIDELA, PEREZ ACCEPTED COMPLEXITY OF PROBLEM BUT POINTED

OUT THAT APPARENT CONTRADICTIONS COULD BE DEALT WITH BY KEEPING OBJECTIVES IN MIND: WE HAVE LITTLE ALTERNATIVE EXCEPT TO DEAL WITH VIDELA AND ENCOURAGE EVOLUTIONARY CHANGE. PEREZ FELT WE MUST HELP ARGENTINA ECONOMICALLY SINCE ECONOMIC DECLINE WOULD UNDERCUT VIDELA, IN HIS VIEW. HE WAS AMBIVALENT ON THE QUESTION OF MILITARY AID TO ARGENTINA. ON THE ONE HAND, HE SAID, MILITARY AID BENEFITS HARD-LINERS. ON THE OTHER HAND, TERMINATION WEAKENS VIDELA'S POSITION. CAP ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT PRESIDENT CARTER UNDERSTOOD VIDELA'S MODERATE POSITION. PEREZ AGREED TO VIDELA ON ARGENTINE RATIFICATION OF TLAELCO, WHICH HE HAD ALSO DISCUSSED WITH LOPEZ MICHELSON WHO INDICATED HE WAS HAVING DIFFICULTIES ON THIS WITH HIS CONGRESS. PEREZ SAID RATHER IT WAS THE ARMED FORCES WITH WHOM

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LOPEZ WAS HAVING DIFFICULTIES.

6. FIGUEREDO, HEAD OF VENEZUELA INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN TRADE, SKETCHED VENEZUELA'S PERCEPTIONS OF THE ANDEAN PACT WHICH HE EMPHASIZED WAS NOT ONLY A MAJOR ISSUE FOR VENEZUELA BUT ALSO WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE ENTIRETY OF OF LATIN AMERICA. THE TWO MAJOR IMMEDIATE ISSUES FOR THE ANDEAN PACT ARE AUTOMOTIVE DEVELOPMENT AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT. HE EMPHASIZED THAT ECONOMIC GROWTH AND POLITICAL STABILITY IN THE CONTINENT COULD NOT BE ENVISIONED WITHOUT ECONOMIC INTEGRATION. CAP BELIEVES THAT PAST US ADMINISTRATIONS OPPOSED LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AS AGAINST THE INTEREST OF THE US. BOTH YOUNG AND PEREZ EMPHASIZED THAT CARTER VIEWED LATIN AMERICAN INTEGRATION IN A DIFFERENT LIGHT. PEREZ POINTED OUT THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH CARTER THE NEED FOR MORE ACTIVE SUPPORT BY THE US FOR LATIN AMERICAN INTEGRATION. PEREZ EMPHASIZED THAT INTEGRATION WAS THE ONLY COURSE FOR LATIN AMERICA TO BECOME MORE COMPETITIVE IN WORLD MARKETS. THE ANDEAN PACT IS NOT A GOAL IN ITSELF BUT RATHER A MEANS OF STRENGTHENING THE ENTIRE AREA. MULTINATIONALS HAVE BEEN HOSTILE TO THE IDEA OF INTEGRATION BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE IT MEANS LESS INCOME FOR THEM. PEREZ SAYS THIS IS NOT TRUE, THAT INTEGRATION WOULD CONVERT LATIN AMERICAN INTO A LARGE MARKET. MULTINATIONALS HAVE ONLY SHORT-TERM VISION; FOR EXAMPLE, CHRYSLER IS TRYING TO SHOOT DOWN THE AUTOMOTIVE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD INDUCE A RESTRICTION ON CHRYSLER AND ONE OTHER UNNAMED MULTI-NATIONAL. PEREZ WOULD APPRECIATE SOME GESTURE SHOWING CARTER'S NEW ATTITUDE TOWARDS LATIN AMERICAN INTEGRATION AND SAID THIS WOULD BE AS IMPORTANT AS HIS EFFORTS ON

HUMAN RIGHTS. HE ASKED US TO BRING THIS UP WITH
CARTER. PEREEZ OUTLINED HIS THOUGHTS ON THE PROCESS
OF LATIN AMERICAN INTEGRATION BEGINNING WITH SUB-
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REGIONAL GROUPS AND MOVING ON TO AN EVENTUAL WIDER
INTEGRATION AS SEEN IN A STRENGTHENED SELA WHICH
WOULD EVEN CREATE ITS OWN MULTINATIONALS.

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FRANK SUGGESTED THAT THE US SUPPORT LATIN AMERICAN
INTEGRATION EFFORTS IN UNCTAD AT THE JANUARY 1978
MINISTERIAL MEETING. PG AND PEREZ THOUGHT THIS WAS
A VERY IMPORTANT IDEA. PEREZ HAS BEEN IN CONTACT
WITH ADMIRAL PARODI ABOUT THE ECONOMIC SITUATION
IN PERU WHICH IS VERY SERIOUS. PEREZ FEELS THERE IS
NO SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM AS LONG AS PERU THINKS OF
WAR WITH CHILE. PEREZ SUGGESTED AN ECONOMIC INTEGRA-
TION PLAN FOR CHILE, PERU AND BOLIVIA TO MORALES
BERMUDEZ WHO VERY MUCH LIKED THE IDEA. VENEZUELA
IS CURRENTLY DRAWING UP WORKING PAPERS ON THIS ISSUE.

PEREZ BELIEVES THERE MUST BE A US ROLE IN SOLVING THE CHILE, BOLIVIA, PERU BORDER DISPUTE, AND THIS MESSAGE IS BEING RELAYED TO SECRETARY TODMAN. PEREZ SEES CHILE AND BOLIVIA AS FAVORABLY DISPOSED TO FINDING SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM, BUT THE STICKY PARTNER BEING PERU.

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7. PEREZ GUERRERO WAS CONCERNED THAT THE US NOT LOSE INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PARTICULARLY ABOUT US WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ILO. VENEZUELA SHARES MUCH OF OUR CONCERN THAT ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL BODIES IN THE UN ARE BEING TURNED INTO POLITICAL FORUMS BUT THREATENING TO WITHDRAW ACCOMPLISHES NOTHING. THE VENEZUELAN DELEGATION ALSO EXPRESSED THEIR BELIEF THAT THE US MUST TAKE TOUGHER STEPS VIZ-A-VIZ ISRAEL TO FORCE CONCESSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST OR EGYPT, SYRIA AND JORDAN WILL BE FORCED TOWARD MORE RADICAL POSITIONS. THIS WILL DAMAGE ISRAEL IN THE LONG RUN. VENEZUELA INDICATED IT HAD PUSHED IN THE GROUP OF NONALIGNED NOT TO EXPEL ISRAEL FROM THE UN.

8. AFRICA: INDECISION OF THE WEST ON AFRICA IS PROMOTING THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION. YOUNG RESPONDED THAT CARTER-NYERERE MEETING WAS VERY SUCCESSFUL. WE CANNOT SOLVE AFRICA'S PROBLEMS ALONE BUT MUST INCLUDE AFRICA. PEREZ POINTED OUT THAT EXCLUDING PARTICIPATION BY LOCAL LEADERS HAS LONG BEEN A MAJOR PROBLEM OF THE US. YOUNG OUTLINED FOR PEREZ THE GENERAL SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND PEREZ WAS VERY PLEASED WITH WHAT HE HEARD. YOUNG TOLD VENEZUELA THAT THEY COULD HELP BY REQUIRING USE OF END-USER CERTIFICATES. PEREZ POINTED OUT THAT THE SHAH OF IRAN GREATLY FEARS SOVIET PENETRATION IN AFRICA, US INDECISION IN AFRICA AND WANTS AN IMMEDIATE SOLUTION TO THE AFRICAN PROBLEM. YOUNG RESPONDED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE MAKING MORE MISTAKES IN AFRICA THAN WE ARE AND HAVE LOST THEIR FOOTHOLD IN THE HORN OF AFRICA. FRANK POINTED OUT THAT VENEZUELA CAN BE HELPFUL IN SOUTH AFRICA BY PAR-

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TICIPATING IN THE ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENT FUND. PEREZ RESPONDED THAT IT COULD BE DONE SO LONG AS THE FUND

NOT INVOLVE COMPENSATION FOR WHITES. PEREZ EXPRESSED DIFFICULTIES WITH ESTABLISHING THE USE OF END-USER CERTIFICATES AS A PRECEDENT, WHICH THOSE NATIONS BELIEVING IN ALLAH MIGHT WELL USE FOR OTHER PURPOSES. FRANK POINTED OUT THAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT ENFORCEMENT OF EXISTING SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA. PEREZ SAID THE DANGER OF END-USER CERTIFICATES IS THAT THEY CAN BE TRANSLATED INTO OTHER USES. HE SUGGESTED THAT A UN RESOLUTION WOULD BE ANOTHER FORM OF RESOLVING THIS PROBLEM.

9. HAITI: IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ON HAITI, PEREZ INDICATED HE HAD LITTLE CONFIDENCE IN THE LEADERSHIP THERE, BUT THAT VENEZUELA HAD MADE A MISTAKE IN VIRTUALLY DISENGAGING FROM HAITI. HE FEELS THIS IS AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY TO BRING UP THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE AND AUTHORIZED US TO EXPRESS VENEZUELA'S WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS FOR HAITI, SHOULD THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION THERE IMPROVE.

10. HUMAN RIGHTS: SCHNEIDER NOTED THAT THERE IS A NEED TO SEE FURTHER STEPS, BUILDING ON THE LEADERSHIP OF VENEZUELA AT THE OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY WHICH PRODUCED A TENTATIVE MAJORITY IN SUPPORT OF A STRONG HUMAN RIGHTS RESOLUTION. CAP RESPONDED POSITIVELY AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT FURTHER STEPS COULD BE TAKEN TO STRENGTHEN THE IAHC. SCHNEIDER ALSO SUGGESTED THAT BEYOND THE MULTINATIONAL FORA IN WHICH THE US AND VENEZUELA COOPERATE ON HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVES, THE TWO COUNTRIES ALSO COULD PERHAPS COLLABORATE MORE ON JOINT OR SUPPORTIVE HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGIES TOWARD OTHER COUNTRIES. HE NOATED THAT FOR INSTANCE IN PARAGUAY, THE US AHAD BEEN URGING A VISIT BY THE

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IAHRC AND VENEZUELA COULD BE HELPFUL IN SUPPORTING THAT EFFORT. CAP SAID HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO DO SO BUT EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT IN PARAGUAY AND IN NICARAGUA REAL CHANGE TOWARD IMPROVED HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS WOULD ONLY TAKE PLACE AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF STROESSNER AND SOMOZA, WHO RAN NICARAGUA AS IF IT WERE HIS PERSONAL HACIENDA.

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11. SCHNEIDER MENTIONED THAT AMBASSADOR YOUNG, IN THE BILATERAL CONTEXT HAD FELT THAT VENEZUELA MIGHT BE HELPFUL WITH REGARD TO CHANGE IN NIGERIA TOWARD CIVILIAN RULE. AMBASSADOR YOUNG THEN NOTED THAT NIGERIA WAS FACING A DIFFICULT TEST IN WHICH MANY OF THE YOUNG OFFICERS OF THE NIGERIAN ARMED FORCES, MANY UNDER 40 YEARS OF AGE, ARE SOMEWHAT UNEASY OVER THEIR STATUS WHEN CIVIL RULE TAKES PLACE AS SCHEDULED NEXT YEAR. HE SAID THAT HE HAD THOUGHT PERHAPS VENEZUELA, WHICH HAD MADE THE TRANSITION FROM AN AUTHORITARIAN RULE UNDER PEREZ JIMENEZ TO DEMOCRACY, MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP GUIDE THE NIGERIANS SO AS TO PERMIT THE TRANSITION TO TAKE PLACE. HE SAID IF THE ARMED FORCES COULD NOT BE SECURE THAT THEY HAD A FUTURE, THE TRANSITION TO CIVIL RULE MIGHT NEVER TAKE PLACE. HE SUGGESTED PERHAPS SENDING BETANCOURT AND SOMEONE FROM THE MILITARY TO NIGERIA TO HELP ASSURE THE NIGERIANS THAT THE PROCESS COULD TAKE PLACE. CAP
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RESPONDED THAT THEY WOULD BE PLEASED TO COOPERATE AND HAD GOOD RELATIONS WITH NIGERIA BUT FELT THAT PERHAPS THEIR FIRST SHOULD BE A VISIT BY THE NIGERIANS TO VENEZUELA AND THEN A FOLLOW-UP VISIT TO NIGERIA. IN THAT REGARD, HE SUGGESTED THAT AMBASSADOR YOUNG SUGGEST THE APPROPRIATE NAMES AND VENEZUELA WOULD INVITE THEM

FOR A VISIT IN WHICH THE DISCUSSION WOULD COVER ALL DEVELOPMENT ASPECTS BUT WOULD HAVE THE MOTIVE OF EASING THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT THE TRANSITION TO CIVIL RULE. AMBASSADOR YOUNG SAID HE WOULD PROVIDE A LIST OF THE NAMES SOON.

12. PANAMA; PEREZ SUGGESTED INVITING ALL LATIN AMERICAN PRESIDENTS TO THE SIGNING OF THE CANAL TREATY AS A MEANS OF DEMONSTRATING LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY AND HELP IN THE RATIFICATION PROCESS. CARTER WAS GENERALLY SYMPATHETIC ACCORDING TO VAKY BUT WANTS TO STUDY THE IDEA -- WHICH WAS APPROVED UNANIMOUSLY IN BOGOTA. PEREZ WAS TO WRITE PRIVATE LETTERS TO ALL PRESIDENTS ON THIS. VAKY EMPHASIZED THE US DESIRE FOR MORE STUDY. THIS STEMS ONLY FROM A CONCERN THAT SUCH A MEETING COULD HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON US SENATE RATIFICATION. ONE PROBLEM IS CUBA. ANOTHER IS WHAT MIGHT BE STATED AT THE CONFERENCE. PEREZ BELIEVES CASTRO'S INCLUSION WOULD BE A POSITIVE FACTOR BUT DOES NOT THINK HE WILL COME. PEREZ IS OPPOSED TO INVITING ONLY DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED LEADERS. THIS WOULD CREATE A BLOC AND WOULD NOT HAVE THE SAME IMPACT AS THE PRESENCE OF ALL. PEREZ BELIEVES BUNKER'S SUGGESTION OF SIGNING WITHIN A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE OAS GA WOULD BE AN ELEGANT MANNER OF EXCLUDING CUBA, BUT WE MUST CONSIDER WHETHER CUBA SHOULD BE EXCLUDED. PEREZ SAYS VENEZUELA
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AND MEXICO WOULD BE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE WITH CUBA ON THE NON-PRESENCE OF CUBA.
YOUNG

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Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
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Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S BREAKFAST MEETING WITH VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT PEREZ
TAGS: OVIP, BH, GT, UK, XL, XM, UNGA, (YOUNG, ANDREW)
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/43c68457-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
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